














Arctic Climate Change and  
U.S. Accession to the 
United Nations Convention on the 




Raul (Pete) Pedrozo 
 
 























Arctic Climate Change and U.S. Accession to the 










     
  ew data released by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA)1 and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA)2 in 2012 and 2013 reveals that the Arctic is melting much faster 
than originally predicted. In September 2012, the Arctic Ocean ice pack 
shrank to its lowest extent on record—49 percent below the average over 
the past 35 years.3 This accelerated decrease in sea ice led the Administra-
                                                                                                                      
* Associate Professor, International Law Department, US Naval War College. 
1. Rani Gran and Maria-José Viñas, NASA Finds Thickest Parts of Arctic Ice Cap Melting 
Faster, NASA GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, Feb. 29, 2012, www.nasa.gov/ top-
ics/earth/features/thick-melt.html (“A new NASA study revealed that the oldest and 
thickest Arctic sea ice is disappearing at a faster rate than the younger and thinner ice at 
the edges of the Arctic Ocean’s floating ice cap.”); A change of pace, NATIONAL SNOW AND 
ICE DATA CENTER, July 17, 2013, http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews /2013/07/a-change-
of-pace/ (“During the first two weeks of July, ice extent declined at a rate . . . 61% faster 
than the average rate of decline over the period 1981 to 2010.”). 
2. Jeffries, M. O., J. A. Richter-Menge and J. E. Overland, Eds., December 2012: Arctic 
Report Card 2012, 36–42, http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard (“Sea ice extent in Sep-
tember 2012 reached the lowest observed in the satellite record (1979–present).”) 
3. Joel Clement, John Bengtson and Brendan Kelly (Lead Authors), Managing for the 












tion to re-think the need for a new national strategy to address the signifi-
cant management, safety and security challenges posed by a rapidly chang-
ing Arctic environment.4 After several months of deliberation, the White 
House released a new National Strategy for the Arctic Region on May 10, 2013 
that seeks to “guide, prioritize, and synchronize efforts to protect U.S. na-
tional and homeland security interests, promote responsible stewardship, 
and foster international cooperation.”5 Eleven days later, the U.S. Coast 
Guard rolled out its new Arctic Strategy, recognizing that there will be an 
“increasing demand for the Coast Guard to ensure the safety, security and 
stewardship of the nation’s arctic waters” as Arctic ice recedes and mari-
time activity increases.6 The new National Strategy will also likely cause the 
U.S. Navy to look at its Arctic Roadmap published in 2009.7 
The National Strategy is built on three lines of effort: 
 
 Advance U.S. security interests; 
 Pursue responsible Arctic region stewardship; and 
 Strengthen international cooperation.8 
                                                                                                                      
Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska 
(Mar. 2013). 
4. The Interagency Working Group report to the President recommended that the 
U.S. Government: 
 
- Adopt an Integrated Arctic Management approach that integrates and balances envi-
ronmental, economic and cultural needs and objectives when making stewardship 
and development decisions affecting the U.S. Arctic; 
- Ensure ongoing high-level White House leadership on Arctic issues, including the 
development of a new National Strategy for the Arctic Region through the Presiden-
tial Policy Directive process; 
- Strengthen key partnerships with the State of Alaska and Alaska Native tribal gov-
ernments and organizations; 
- Promote better stakeholder engagement on planning and management issues; and 
- Coordinate and streamline federal action by identifying overlapping missions and re-
ducing duplication of effort. 
 
Id., at 3. 
5. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 10, 2013, at 5, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 
6. United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, The United States Coast Guard’s Vision for 
Operating in the Arctic Region: Ensure Safe, Secure and Environmentally Responsible Maritime Activity 
in the Arctic, May 21, 2013. 
7. Memorandum from J.W. Greenert, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Navy Artic Roadmap 
















One of the key supporting objectives identified in the strategy to ad-
vance U.S. security interests is the need to preserve Arctic region freedom 
of the seas recognized under international law.9 To that end, the new strat-
egy suggests that U.S. efforts to strengthen international cooperation and 
partnerships can best be achieved by acceding to the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).10 
The remaining sections of this article will analyze whether the observed 
acceleration of climate change in the Arctic region provides the United 
States with new incentives that tip the balance in favor of finally acceding 
to the Convention. 
 
II. A CONSTITUTION FOR THE WORLD’S OCEANS 
 
UNCLOS provides a comprehensive legal framework regarding uses of the 
oceans. Negotiated over a nine year period (1973–1982) by more than 150 
delegations, UNCLOS carefully balances the interests of States to control 
activities off their coasts with those of all States to use the oceans without 
                                                                                                                      
8. The new strategy will be informed by the following guiding principles: 
 
- Safeguard peace and stability; 
- Make decisions using the best available information; 
- Pursue innovative arrangements; and 
- Consult and coordinate with Alaska Natives. 
 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 10, 2013, at 2–3. 
9. The National Strategy states,  
 
The United States has a national interest in preserving all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of 
the sea and airspace recognized under international law. . . . Existing international law provides 
a comprehensive set of rules governing the rights, freedoms, and uses of the world’s oceans 
and airspace, including the Arctic. The law recognizes these rights, freedoms, and uses for 
commercial and military vessels and aircraft. . . . We will also encourage other nations to adhere 
to internationally accepted principles. 
 
Id., at 6. 
10. The National Strategy states,   
 
Accession to the Convention would protect U.S. rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and air-
space throughout the Arctic region, and strengthen our arguments for freedom of navigation 
and overflight through the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. . . . While the 
United States is not currently a party to the Convention, we will continue to support and ob-
serve principles of established customary international law reflected in the Convention. 
 













undue interference. Although the United States played a key role in devel-
oping the terms of the Convention consistent with U.S. national interests, 
President Reagan elected not to sign the treaty when it opened for signa-
ture, citing concerns with Part XI of the Convention on deep sea bed min-
ing.11 Despite America’s refusal to sign UNCLOS, the President recognized 
that the Convention “contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of 
the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and 
                                                                                                                      
11. President Ronald Reagan’s Statement on United States Participation in the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Jan. 29, 1982:  
 
[L]ast March, I announced that my administration would undertake a thorough review of the 
current draft and the degree to which it met United States interests . . .  Our review has con-
cluded that while most provisions of the draft convention are acceptable and consistent with 
United States interests, some major elements of the deep seabed mining regime are not ac-
ceptable. . . . In the deep seabed mining area, we will seek changes necessary to correct those 
unacceptable elements and to achieve the goal of a treaty that:  
 
- will not deter development of any deep seabed mineral resources to meet national and 
world demand;  
- will assure national access to these resources by current and future qualified entities to en-
hance U.S. security of supply, to avoid monopolization of the resources by the operating 
arm of the International Authority, and to promote the economic development of the re-
sources; 
- will provide a decision-making role in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and effec-
tively protects the political and economic interests and financial contributions of partici-
pating states;  
- will not allow for amendments to come into force without approval of the participating 
states, including in our case the advice and consent of the Senate;  
- will not set other undesirable precedents for international organizations; and  
- will be likely to receive the advice and consent of the Senate. In this regard, the conven-
tion should not contain provisions for the mandatory transfer of private technology and 
participation by and funding for national liberation movements. 
 
The United States remains committed to the multilateral treaty process for reaching 
agreement on Law of the Sea. If working together at the Conference we can find ways to fulfill 
these key objectives, my administration will support ratification. 
 
See also President Ronald Reagan's Statement on United States Oceans Policy [hereinafter 
Ocean Policy Statement], Mar. 10, 1983: 
 
Last July, I announced that the United States will not sign the United Nations Law of the 
Sea Convention that was opened for signature on December 10. We have taken this step 
because several major problems in the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions are 
contrary to the interests and principles of industrialized nations and would not help attain 














fairly balance the interests of all states.”12 Accordingly, the President an-
nounced that the United States was:  
 
prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests re-
lating to traditional uses of the oceans—such as navigation and overflight. 
In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states 
in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as 
the rights and freedoms of the United States and others under interna-
tional law are recognized by such coastal states.13 
 
Widespread recognition that the Convention’s deep seabed mining re-
gime was fundamentally flawed and required basic change in order to make 
it generally acceptable to the industrialized nations prompted the U.N. Sec-
retary-General to convene a series of informal meetings in New York in 
1990 to begin negotiation of a new agreement that would correct the objec-
tionable provisions of Part XI. These efforts resulted in the adoption of the 
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, with Annex.14 The Implementing Agreement (IA) 
contains a number of legally binding changes that meet the six objections 
to Part XI raised by President Reagan in 1982. As a result, the United 
States and all other major industrialized nations have signed the IA.15 
On October 7, 1994, President Clinton submitted UNCLOS and the 
IA to the Senate for advice and consent to accession and ratification, re-
spectively. Despite widespread bi-partisan support, the concurrence of all 
the Federal agencies and departments with ocean interests, and support 
from the U.S. maritime industries (oil and gas, shipping, telecommunica-
tions, marine science, fishing) and environmental groups, the Convention 
and its Implementing Agreement have languished in the Senate for the past 
20 years. 
                                                                                                                      
12. Ocean Policy Statement, Mar. 10, 1983. 
13. Id. 
14. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annex, Oct. 7, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, 
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [herenafter Annex to AI]. A/RES/48/263, July 28, 1994.  
15. Letter from George P. Shultz (Secretary of State under President Reagan) to Sena-
tor Richard Lugar, June 28, 2007, http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_law_ 
of_the_sea.htm (“The treaty has been changed in such a way with respect to the deep sea-
bed that it is now acceptable, in my judgment. Under these circumstances, and given the 
many desirable aspects of the treaty on other grounds, I believe it is time to proceed with 













The United States is the only major maritime power and major indus-
trialized nation that has not joined the Convention. UNCLOS entered into 
force on November 16, 1994, and as of August 2013 has 166 parties. The 
IA entered into force on July 28, 1996, and currently has 145 parties. Alt-
hough the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it continues to view 
the Convention’s navigational provisions as reflective of customary interna-
tional law and therefore binding on all nations.16 
Clearly, the original objections to the deep seabed mining provisions of 
the Convention have been rectified and are no longer grounds for objec-
tion. Thus, while the U.S. military, commercial interests and certain non-
governmental organizations have recognized and advocated for the United 
States to accede to the Convention for many years, the Senate has failed to 
act. The impacts of climate change in the Arctic region, however, should 
provide the necessary impetus for the U.S. Senate to revisit UNCLOS and 
provide its advice and consent to support U.S. accession to this important 
treaty. 
 
III. BENEFITS OF JOINING UNCLOS 
 
Since 1994, all succeeding Administrations—Democrat and Republican 
alike—have strongly supported U.S. accession to the Convention. UN-
CLOS has likewise garnered significant attention on Capitol Hill, with 13 
full committee hearings devoted exclusively to UNCLOS being convened 
by five different Congressional committees in the last 20 years. Nonethe-
less, despite widespread support by all major stakeholders since the mid-
1990s, proponents of the Convention have not succeeded in convincing a 
handful of ideologues—who continue to fallaciously view UNCLOS as an 
assault on U.S. sovereignty—that accession is in the best interests of the 
United States. The reasons for this failure are varied. First, while many of 
the arguments advanced by UNCLOS supporters over the years remain 
valid today, others have not stood the test of time or have lost much of 
their luster in the intervening years. Second, some UNCLOS proponents 
have eroded support for the Convention by articulating factually incorrect 
or overinflated statements in an effort to sensationalize the need to join the 
Convention, in the same way UNCLOS opponents argue against U.S. rati-
fication by conjuring up the evils of the New International Economic Or-
                                                                                                                      
16. This position does not allow the United States to benefit from many of the other pro-













der and the original flaws of Part XI. In short, having operated outside the 
Convention for 30 years, senators opposing accession remain unconvinced 
that it is still critical for the United States to accede to the Convention. 
Climate change in the Arctic region provides the current Administration 
with an opportunity to re-engage these skeptical senators with new reasons 
that support Senate advice and consent to accession. 
 
A. Extended Continental Shelf Resources  
 
As a result of melting sea ice, access to sizeable and lucrative offshore hy-
drocarbon and other mineral reserves in the Arctic Ocean will occur soon-
er than projected. Many of these resources are located beyond 200 nautical 
miles (nm) off the coast.  
According to a 2008 assessment by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 
“the total mean undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources in the 
Arctic are estimated to be approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 tril-
lion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.”17 
The overwhelming majority of these resources—84 percent—is expected 
to occur in offshore areas. Over 70 percent “of the mean undiscovered oil 
resources is estimated to occur in five provinces: Arctic Alaska, Amerasia 
Basin, East Greenland Rift Basins, East Barents Basins, and West Green-
land-East Canada.”18 Similarly, over 70 percent “of the undiscovered natu-
ral gas is estimated to occur in three provinces: the West Siberian Basin, the 
East Barents Basins, and Arctic Alaska.”19 Arctic Alaska, the Amerasia Ba-
sin, and the North Chukchi-Wrangel Foreland Basin provinces, portions of 
which could be claimed by the United States, account for over 40 million 
barrels of oil, 284 billion cubic feet of natural gas, 6.5 million barrels of 
natural gas liquids and 94 million barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural 
                                                                                                                      
17. USGS Arctic Oil and Gas Report, Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arc-














gas.20 The value of these resources is estimated to be in the trillions of dol-
lars.21 
All states may claim a 200 nm continental shelf. In addition, States Par-
ties to UNCLOS may file claims with the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) for exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
over the seabed resources of an Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) extend-
ing hundreds of miles offshore.22 If the United States becomes a party to 
UNCLOS, it has strong ECS claims over the resources of the Beaufort 
shelf and the Chukchi shelf.23 
Offshore oil and gas exploitation could generate thousands of U.S. jobs 
and billions of dollars in new government revenues, as well as extend the 
life of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). A 2010 study conducted 
by Northern Economics and the University of Alaska Institute for Social 
and Economic Research found that developing oil and gas resources off 
Alaska would create an average of 54,700 new jobs per year, result in a total 
of $145 billion in new payroll nationwide, and generate a total of $193 bil-
lion in new government revenue.24 
Between 1977 and 2010, TAPS supplied U.S. refineries with over 17 
billion barrels of oil. However, due to the fall in production of oil in Pru-
dhoe Bay over the past 20 years, the amount of oil flowing through the 
pipeline has fallen from 2.1 million to 600,000 barrels per day. According 
to Peter Slaiby (Vice President of Shell Alaska), “[i[f the throughput in the 
pipeline continues to decline and no new supplies are developed, TAPS will 
eventually be shut down, cutting access to one of the largest sources of 
domestically produced oil in the country” and increasing U.S. dependence 
                                                                                                                      
20. Id. See also USGS assessments in 2012 confirming these findings, Assessment of Un-
discovered Petroleum Resources of the Arctic Alaska Petroleum Province, U.S. Geological Survey 
Scientific Investigations Report 2012–5147; Assessment of Undiscovered Petroleum Resources of 
the Amerasia Basin Petroleum Province, U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 
2012–5146). 
21. The price of oil and natural gas on Aug. 14, 2013 was US$106.55/bbl and 
US$3.36/MMBtu, respectively. 
22. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], art. 76. 
23. S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–39, supra note 15, at 56. 
24. S. Hrg. 112-234, Defending U.S. Economic Interests in the Changing Arctic: Is There a 
Strategy?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and Coast 
Guard of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Sen-
ate, 112th Congress, 1st Session, (July 27, 2011) (statement of Peter E. Slaiby, Vice Presi-













on foreign oil imports.25 Offshore oil deposits in U.S. Arctic waters would 
breathe new life into TAPS. 
Granted, as UNCLOS critics are quick to point out, access to the ECS 
under UNCLOS is contingent upon payment of royalties to the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority (ISBA) for oil and gas development beyond 200 
nautical miles (nm).26 However, the royalty framework is relatively insignifi-
cant compared to the fee-sharing arrangements for overseas oil and gas 
development and the enormous economic benefits anticipated from off-
shore resource development. Revenue sharing does not begin until the 6th 
year of production of a particular well or site, starts at 1% of the value of 
production and increases 1% per year. By the 12th year and remaining years 
thereafter, the royalty is 7% of the value of production, paid either in kind 
or in dollars.27 During the 1970s, these revenue sharing provisions were 
negotiated in consultation with the U.S. oil and gas industry. 
Payments are to be distributed by the ISBA to States Parties of UN-
CLOS in accordance with Article 82(4) on the basis of equitable criteria 
that take into account economic development factors. Of note, this distri-
bution is distinct from the distribution of revenues generated from deep 
seabed mining operations under Part XI of the Convention. As a State Par-
ty to UNCLOS, the United States would have a permanent seat in the 
ISBA to ensure both kinds of distributions are made in ways acceptable to 
the United States—Section 3(15) of the Annex to the IA guarantees the 
United States a seat on the ISBA Council in perpetuity.28 Any ISBA deci-
sion regarding revenue sharing must be approved by the Council.29 Addi-
tionally, if distributions are made to a country that is already receiving U.S. 
foreign aid, the United States could offset aid to that country by the 
amount of distributions paid by the ISBA, in essence eliminating any in-
crease financial burden to the American taxpayers. 
Critics suggest accession to UNCLOS is not required in order for the 
United States to claim an ECS, since the 1958 Continental Shelf Conven-
tion and the 1945 Truman Proclamation already support a unilateral U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
25. Id. 
26. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 82. 
27. Id.. 
28. Annex to AI, supra note 14, Section 3(15) (providing that the State with the largest 
economy in terms of gross domestic product as of November 16, 1994, is guaranteed a 
seat on the Council). 













claim. Although that may be true, the metric for determining the outer ex-
tent of the ECS is more generous in UNCLOS than in the 1958 Conven-
tion or the Truman Proclamation, both of which rely on an “exploitability 
criterion” to identify the outer limit of the ECS.30 More importantly, the 
U.S. oil and gas industry believes that unilaterally claiming an ECS outside 
UNCLOS may be challenged by other nations in courts throughout the 
world, and has therefore repeatedly argued that legal certainty/security of 
tenure to explore and exploit the resources of the ECS can be obtained 
only through UNCLOS.31 The bottom line is that U.S. industry will not 
invest in offshore oil and gas production in the ECS unless the United 
States is a party to UNCLOS.32  
                                                                                                                      
30. Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311: 
 
For the purpose of these articles, the term ‘continental shelf’ is used as referring (a) to the sea-
bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territo-
rial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed 
and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 
 
See also Proclamation 2667—Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Re-
sources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Sept. 28, 1945. 
31. Convention on the Law of the Sea, S. Exec. Rpt. No. 110–9, Committee on For-
eign Relations (Dec. 19, 2007) at 9: 
 
In an era when the United States faces growing energy vulnerability, failing to accede to the 
Convention will constrain the opportunities of U.S. energy companies to explore beyond 200 
nm. Mr. Paul Kelly, testifying on behalf of the oil and gas industry, asserted that under the 
Convention, the United States would have the opportunity to receive international recognition 
of its economic sovereignty over more than 291,000 square miles of extended continental shelf. 
Much of this is in the Arctic, which holds approximately one quarter of the world’s undiscov-
ered oil and natural gas, according to the U.S. Geological Survey World Petroleum Assessment 
in 2000. 
 
32. U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Statement of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, The Law of the Sea Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-39):  The U.S. National Security and Strategic 
Imperatives for Ratification, The U.S. National Security and Strategic Imperatives for Ratifica-
tion (May 23, 2012), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/05/190685.htm: 
 
U.S. oil and gas companies are now ready, willing, and able to explore this area. But they have 
made it clear to us that they need the maximum level of international legal certainty before they 
will or could make the substantial investments, and, we believe, create many jobs in doing so 
needed to extract these far-offshore resources. If we were a party to the convention, we would 
gain international recognition of our sovereign rights, including by using the convention's pro-
cedures, and therefore be able to give our oil and gas companies this legal certainty. Staying 














The sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion—that is, beyond the 200 nm continental shelf or beyond the ECS es-
tablished pursuant to UNCLOS—to include all resource exploration and 
exploitation activities, are regulated by the ISBA, in accordance with Part 
XI of the Convention and the Part XI IA. If the United States continues to 
delay establishing the outer limit of its ECS in the Arctic, other nations may 
undercut U.S. claims and receive ISBA license to extract resources in areas 
that otherwise could be under exclusive U.S. jurisdiction.  
In May 2013, five Asian nations—including China—were granted ob-
server status in the Arctic Council, and China has stated it does not intend 
to be a “wallflower” in the forum.33 Beijing has expressed an interest in de-
veloping new shipping routes through the Arctic that will connect China 
with its largest export market—the European Union. To that end, in Au-
gust 2013, a Chinese merchant vessel loaded with heavy equipment and 
steel set sail from Dalian en route to Rotterdam via the Arctic’s Northern 
Sea Route (NSR).34 China has also expressed an interest in developing Arc-
tic resources. In March 2010, Rear Admiral Yin Zhou of the People’s Lib-
eration Army Navy stated at the Eleventh Chinese People’s Political Con-
sultative Conference that “under . . . UNCLOS, the Arctic does not belong 
to any particular nation and is rather the property of all the world’s people” 
and that “China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as it 
has one-fifth of the world’s population.”35 Officials from the State Oceanic 
Administration have similarly indicated that China is a “near Arctic state” 
and that the Arctic is an “inherited wealth for all humankind.”36 As a party 
to UNCLOS, the United States could claim an ECS in the Arctic and fore-





                                                                                                                      
33. Linda Jakobson, Preparing for an ice-free Arctic, CHINA DIALOGUE, Apr. 21, 2010 
(Although China recognizes that the Arctic is primarily a regional issue, the Assistant Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs indicated in a speech at an Arctic forum in 2009 on Svalbard that 
“concerns over climate change and international shipping gave [the Arctic] inter-regional 
dimensions.”). 
34. Bill Savadove, China reveals its Arctic ambitions in new shipping route, JAPAN TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 2013. 
35. Jakobson, supra note 33. 
36. Bhavna Singh, China And The Arctic: The Next ‘Strategic’ Frontline?, EURASIA RE-












B. Freedom of Navigation  
 
U.S. freedom of navigation interests in the Arctic would be bolstered by 
joining UNCLOS. Both Russia and Canada have maritime claims in the 
Arctic that are inconsistent with the rules contained in the Convention.  
Russia37 and Canada38 draw excessive straight baselines in the Arctic 
and restrict the right of transit passage in various international straits in the 
Arctic, including the Northeast Passage, the Northwest Passage and vari-
ous straits located within Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR)—the 
Demitri, Laptev and Sannikov Straits. Russia’s straight baselines closing the 
NSR straits and Canada’s straight baselines around its Arctic Islands do not 
meet the legal criteria contained in Article 7 of the Convention.39 Accord-
ing to UNCLOS Article 5, the correct baseline for these areas is the low-
water line. UNCLOS Article 38 also provides that the right of transit pas-
sage through international straits cannot be suspended or impeded by the 
bordering States. Use of straight baselines by Russia and Canada to close 
these international straits is therefore inconsistent with the Convention. 
Furthermore, under UNCLOS Article 8(2), all nations enjoy at least the 
right of innocent passage in areas within newly drawn straight baselines.  
The United States has diplomatically protested and operationally chal-
lenged these excessive straight baseline claims under the U.S. Freedom of 
Navigation Program, citing the provisions of UNCLOS and customary in-
                                                                                                                      
37. List of Geographical Coordinates of the Points Determining the Baselines Posi-
tion for Measuring the Breadth of the Territorial Waters, Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf of the USSR, Adopted by Decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers on Feb. 7, 
1984; List of Geographical Coordinates of the Points Determining the Baselines Position 
for Measuring the Breadth of the Territorial Waters, Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf of the USSR, Adopted by Decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers on Jan. 15, 
1985; Federal Act on the internal maritime waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone of 
the Russian Federation, Adopted by the State Duma on July 16, 1998, Approved by the 
Federation Council on July 17, 1998. 
38. Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates (Area 7) Order, P.C., SOR/1985–872 
(Can.). 
39. UNCLOS, supra note 22, article 7 states, 
 
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of is-
lands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining the 
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of 














ternational law.40 However, the U.S. legal position would be on better foot-
ing if the United States was a party to the Convention. 
Russia and Canada have also enacted domestic laws and regulations to 
regulate maritime traffic in their Arctic waters, citing UNCLOS Article 234 
as their legal basis.41 Although Article 234 does allow coastal States to 
adopt and enforce measures to prevent, reduce and control vessel-source 
pollution in ice-covered areas, such measures must have “due regard to 
navigation.” Both the Russian and Canadian laws and regulations in ques-
tion, however, exceed what is permissible under international law, including 
the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS)42 and UNCLOS. They also 
exceed current International Maritime Organization (IMO) construction, 
design, equipment and manning (CDEM) standards set out in the IMO 
Polar Code.43 
Russia’s NSR regulations44 and Canada’s Northern Canada Vessel Traf-
fic Service Zone Regulations (NORDREGS)45 were unilaterally adopted 
without IMO approval. However, mandatory ship routing,46 mandatory 
                                                                                                                      
40. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Maritime Claims Reference Manual, DOD 2005.1-m (June 23, 
2005), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm.  
41. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 234 (Ice-covered areas) provides:  
 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for 
the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas 
within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions 
and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or excep-
tional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm 
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have 
due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based 
on the best available scientific evidence. 
 
42. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Annex, Ch. V, Reg. 33(1), 
Nov. 1, 1974, T.I.A.S. No. 9700 [hereinafter SOLAS]. 
43. Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, IMO Doc.A26/Res. 1024 Annex 
(Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id 
=29985&filename=A1024(26).pdf.   
44. Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route, Approved 
by the USSR Minister of Merchant Marine, Sept. 14, 1990; Requirements for Design, 
Equipment and Supply of Vessels Navigating the Northern Sea Route; 1996 Regulations 
for Icebreaker and Pilot Guiding of Vessels Through the Northern Sea Route. 
45. Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations, Canada Gazette, Vol. 
144, No. 9, Feb. 27, 2010. 
46. SOLAS, supra note 42, Regulation V/10 provides, in part,  
 
1. . . . Ships’ routing systems . . . may be made mandatory . . . when adopted and implemented 












ship reporting47 and mandatory vessel traffic services (VTS)48 that apply 
beyond the 12-nm territorial sea of a coastal State must be submitted to 
and approved by the IMO under SOLAS Chapter V. SOLAS Regulations 
V/10(9) and V/11(8) further provide that all routing and reporting “sys-
tems and actions taken to enforce compliance with those systems shall be 
consistent with international law, including . . . [UNCLOS].”  
Coastal State maritime traffic regulations adopted by the IMO must al-
so be applied consistent with the right of transit passage guaranteed to all 
ships and aircraft by Part III of UNCLOS.49 To the extent that the Russian 
and Canadian regulations require compulsory pilotage and prior permission 
to transit international straits, they violate UNCLOS Articles 38 and 42, 
which prohibit coastal States from adopting domestic measures that im-
pede or “have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the 
right of transit passage.”50 
Application of domestic environmental laws and regulations adopted 
pursuant to Article 234 is also subordinate to UNCLOS Article 236, which 
exempts all sovereign immune vessels from the environmental provisions 
of the Convention.51 NORDREGS exempts warships from compliance; 
                                                                                                                      
Governments shall refer proposals for the adoption of ships’ routeing systems to the…[IMO]. . 
. .  4. Ships’ routeing systems should be submitted to the . . . [IMO] for adoption. 
 
47. SOLAS, supra note 42, Regulation V/11 (providing, in part, “[a] ship reporting 
system, when adopted and implemented in accordance with the guidelines and criteria 
developed by the . . . [IMO] . . ., shall be used by all ships. . . . Contracting Governments 
shall refer proposals for the adoption of ship reporting systems to the . . . [IMO].” 
48. SOLAS, supra note 42, Regulation V/12 stipulates, in part, “[the use of VTS may 
only be made mandatory in sea areas within the territorial seas of a coastal State.”  
49. SOLAS, supra note 42, Regulations V/10(10), V/11(9) and V/12(5) (providing 
that “[n]othing in this regulation nor its associated guidelines and criteria shall prejudice 
the rights and duties of Governments under international law or the legal regimes of 
straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea lanes.”). 
50. Of note, on August 23, 2013, a Greenpeace icebreaker—the Arctic Sunrise—set sail 
for the Arctic to challenge Russia’s prior permission regime for the NSR after being de-
nied a permit to transit the Russian waterway on three previous occasions. Bob Weber, 
Greenpeace to defy Russians, enter Arctic seas without permit, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Aug. 26, 
2013.   
51. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 236 (Sovereign immunity): 
 
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine en-
vironment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or oper-
ated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service. 
However, each State shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing oper-













however, other government sovereign immune vessels are not exempt. The 
NSR regulations do not exempt sovereign immune vessels from the duty to  
comply. To the extent that the Russian and Canadian laws and regulations 
apply to sovereign immune vessels, they are inconsistent with international 
law, including UNCLOS Article 236 and SOLAS, Regulation V/1.52 
As a party to UNCLOS, U.S. opposition to these unilateral laws and 
regulations would be strengthened to include the possibility of compulsory 
dispute settlement under Part XV of the Convention. Application of these 
domestic measures in the EEZ and in international straits clearly interferes 
with U.S. high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful 
uses of the seas. Such actions also exceed IMO-approved rules and stand-
ards for the protection of the marine environment in the EEZ. Moreover, 
neither government has provided sufficient data to demonstrate that their 
domestic laws and regulations are based on the best available scientific evi-
dence, as required by UNCLOS Article 234. The Convention’s compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures can be invoked by a State Party for a num-
ber of reasons, including interference with high seas freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea in the EEZ (Article 
297(1)(a)) and contravention of international rules and standards for the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment in the EEZ (Article 
297(1)(c)). 
 
C. American Leadership  
 
The United States has historically been the world leader in protecting the 
common interest in navigational freedom and the rule of the law in the 
oceans. However, America has temporarily lost that leadership by its con-
                                                                                                                      
vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this 
Convention. 
 
52. Consistent with UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 234, SOLAS, supra note 42, Regula-
tion V/1 states, in part: 
 
Unless expressly provided otherwise, this chapter shall apply to all ships on all voyages, except: 
.1 warships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned or operated by a Contracting Government 
and used only on government non-commercial service . . . . However, warships, naval auxilia-
ries or other ships owned or operated by a Contracting Government and used only on gov-
ernment non-commercial service are encouraged to act in a manner consistent, so far as rea-













tinued non-adherence to UNCLOS. U.S. accession to the Convention will 
restore that role and advance U.S. leadership in Arctic Ocean issues.  
Joining UNCLOS will put the United States on an even footing with 
the other Arctic nations, as America assumes the chairmanship of the Arc-
tic Council from Canada in 2015. All of the Council’s member States (ex-
cept the United States) and its 12 observer States are parties to the Conven-
tion. Moreover, in 2008, the five Arctic coastal States (Canada, Denmark, 
Russia, Norway and the United States) declared at Ilulissat that the law of 
the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS, is the legal framework that governs the 
Arctic Ocean, and there is no need for a new legal regime to govern the 
Arctic Ocean.53 Therefore, U.S. participation in the Arctic Council recog-
nizes UNCLOS as the governing framework in the Arctic. 
The Arctic Council provides a forum for promoting cooperation, co-
ordination and interaction among the Arctic States on common Arctic is-
sues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection. The Council adopted an Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) 
agreement in 201154 and an Arctic oil response agreement in 2013,55 both 
of which take into account the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. The 
member States of the Arctic Council are also leading the way for the devel-
opment of a mandatory Polar Code at the IMO that will give context to 
UNCLOS Article 234, while giving due regard to navigation.  
Similarly, the Council will have an increasing role in developing man-
agement regimes for Arctic fisheries beyond areas of national jurisdiction. 
Although there are currently no commercial fisheries in the Arctic, salmon 
and other fish are expected to move north as global warming alters sea ice 
                                                                                                                      
53. The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, May 27-
28, 2008: 
 
[T]he law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of 
the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including 
ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. 
We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible 
overlapping claims. This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management 
by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national implementation and 
application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive 
international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.  
 
54. Arctic Council’s Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search 
and Rescue in the Arctic, May 12, 2011, available at http://www.library.arcticportal 
.org/1474/1/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf. 
55. Arctic Council’s Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re-













conditions.56 This northern migration will result in a concomitant increase 
in the number of fishing vessels operating further north of their traditional 
fishing grounds. Increased fishing activities in the region could lead to in-
creased foreign incursions into the U.S. EEZ, as well as overfishing in areas 
beyond the EEZs of the other Arctic States. As a result, in 2009, the Unit-
ed States imposed a moratorium on commercial fishing in the Arctic Man-
agement Area—U.S. Federal waters north of the Bering Strait in the Chuk-
chi and Beaufort Seas—until more information is available to support sus-
tainable fisheries management.57 
Nevertheless, the United States cannot “go it alone” in the Arctic—it 
will need the cooperation of the other member States of the Arctic Council 
to ensure that U.S. conservation efforts initiated with the Arctic Fisheries 
Management Plan are not put in jeopardy. The Council’s work in this re-
gard will be informed by the provisions of UNCLOS relating to the con-
servation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks (Articles 63 and 64), as well as the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, which elaborates on the 
fundamental principles of conservation and management established in 
UNCLOS Articles 116-120.  
U.S. leadership in evaluating other nations ECS claims in the Arctic is 
also lacking. As a non-Party to UNCLOS, the United States is not only 
precluded from filing an ECS claim with the CLCS, it also cannot partici-
pate in the CLCS process to evaluate and make recommendations on other 
States’ ECS claims in the Arctic and elsewhere. Russia submitted an Arctic 
ECS claim to the CLCS in 2001 (partially revised in February 2013).58 In 
February 2002, the United States filed a notification with the United Na-
tions regarding the Russian submission, indicating that it lacks sufficient 
                                                                                                                      
56. Joel Clement, John Bengtson and Brendan Kelly (Lead Authors), Managing for the 
Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic, A Report to the President from the Interagency Working 
Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska 
(Mar. 2013). 
57. Fisheries of the United States Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska; Fisheries of 
the Arctic Management Area; Bering Sea Subarea, 74 FR 56734, Nov. 3, 2009. 
58. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer limits of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Com-
mission: Submission by the Russian Federation, Dec. 20, 2001, and Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Partial revised Submis-













scientific data to support Russia’s ECS claim in the Arctic.59 The U.S. noti-
fication also invoked UNCLOS, stressing “the importance of promoting 
stability of relations in the oceans, and of complying with the provisions of 
Article 76 of . . . [UNCLOS].”  
However, as a non-Party to UNCLOS, the United States lacks standing 
to challenge other nations’ excessive claims in the Arctic citing the provi-
sions of the Convention. The same is true in other regions of the world. 
China, for example, continues to pursue an aggressive posture in the South 
China Sea and routinely criticizes the United States for not being a Party to 
UNCLOS—“the U.S. insists that China must base its [South China Sea] 
claims solely on the 1982 UNCLOS although the U.S. itself has not ratified 
it.”60 Similarly, when Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982, it filed a declaration 
indicating, inter alia, that “only states parties to the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion shall be entitled to benefit from the contractual rights created therein, 
[including] the right of Transit passage through straits used for internation-
al navigation.”61 Thus, Iran argues that the United States does not enjoy a 
right of transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz because that right is 
contractual in nature. Joining the Convention would put the United States 




The United States has basic and enduring national interests in the oceans. 
These diverse interests—security, economic, scientific, dispute settlement, 
environmental, and leadership—are best protected through a comprehen-
sive, widely accepted international agreement that governs the varying (and 
sometimes competing) uses of the sea. Although the United States has 
lived outside the Convention for 30 years, climate change in the Arctic 
provides the current Administration with a new and urgent incentive to re-
engage the Senate and urge that body to provide its advice and consent to 
                                                                                                                      
59. United States of America: Notification regarding the submission made by the 
Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA, Mar. 18, 2002, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new 
/commission_submissions.htm (“The United States believes that the submission has ma-
jor flaws as it relates to the continental shelf claim in the Arctic.”). 
60. Mark Valencia, The South China Sea: What China Could Say, NAPSNet Policy Fo-
rum, May 7, 2013.  
61. Declaration by the Islamic Republic of Iran upon signing the 1982 United Nations 














U.S. accession to the treaty at the earliest opportunity. As a nation with 
both coastal and maritime interests, the United States would benefit im-
mensely from becoming a party to UNCLOS—accession will restore U.S. 
oceans leadership, protect U.S. ocean interests and enhance U.S. foreign 
policy objectives, not only in the Arctic, but globally. 
